M aking effective decisions under risk often requires making accurate predictions of other people's decisions under risk. We experimentally assess the accuracy of people's predictions of others' risky choices. In four studies, we find evidence of systematic inaccuracy: predictions of others' choices are too regressive. That is, people predict that others' choices will be closer to risk neutrality than those choices actually are. Where people are risk seeking, they predict that others will be risk seeking but substantially less so; likewise, where people are risk averse, they predict that others will be risk averse but substantially less so. Put differently, people predict that others' choices will reveal a more muted form of prospect theory's fourfold pattern of risk preferences than actually prevails. Two psychological concepts, the notion of risk-as-feelings and of an empathy gap, help account for regressive mispredictions. We explore several debiasing techniques suggested by these notions and also find that self-reported ratings of empathy moderate the magnitude of regressive mispredictions.
Introduction
Making effective decisions under risk or uncertainty often requires making accurate predictions of other people's decisions under risk or uncertainty. To illustrate, consider the managers at a pharmaceutical firm that are deciding whether to attempt development of a new allergy drug. These managers must of course assess their own risk tolerance, determining whether, for them, the chances and consequences of a successful development attempt outweigh the chances and consequences of an unsuccessful development attempt. Importantly, these managers must also predict the preferences under risk of many others, including consumers, executives at competitor firms, and employees. First, would consumers risk trying a new, alternative allergy drug or simply stick with brands they know well and purchase regularly? Second, how would executives at other firms respond to the development of a new drug? Would these competitors bear the risk of attempting to develop a next generation of potential rival treatments, thereby imperiling the new drug's profitability? Third, in the course of the development process, how should the firm compensate the scientists and doctors it employs? Would they prefer and be better motivated by a salary-based system that provides a guaranteed, stable income or by a performance-based system that offers substantial bonuses in the event of a successful development process but only modest remuneration in the event of an unsuccessful development process?
As the pharmaceutical example suggests, accurate predictions of others' preferences under risk are essential to much decision making. In general, accurate prediction of others' risky preferences are critical in any strategic interaction (where what one's counterparts will choose to do will depend on how they react to uncertainty about what you will do), whenever one can offer a certain group options that differ in their risk exposure (as in the consumer and employee settings above), or whenever one must make choices on behalf of others (e.g., an individual may have to predict what medical procedure an ailing and incapacitated relative would most prefer). Indeed, in such situations, the value of many research-derived game-theoretic prescriptions and of many decision-analytic tools rests, to some extent, on the implicit assumption that people, even if they are not perfectly accurate, can at least predict the risky preferences of others without being prone to systematic biases.
In this paper, we experimentally assess the accuracy of people's predictions of others' risky choices. We are especially concerned with predictions of people with whom an individual is not highly familiar. Assessing the risky preferences of people whom one does not know or of the "representative" individual in a population is an extremely common task. For instance, the consumers, rival executives, and employees cited in the pharmaceutical example above may essentially be complete strangers to the managers at the firm in question.
In four experiments, we find evidence of systematic inaccuracy: predictions of others' choices are too regressive. That is, people predict that others' choices will be closer to risk neutrality than those choices actually are. Where people tend to be risk seeking, they predict that other people will be risk seeking but substantially less so; likewise, where people tend to be risk averse, they predict that other people will be risk averse but substantially less so.
Seminal research in prospect theory indicates what kinds of situations typically induce either risk seeking or risk aversion. In particular, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identified a fourfold pattern: people tend to be risk seeking for small probability gains, risk averse for small probability losses, risk averse for moderate and large probability gains, and risk seeking for moderate and large probability losses. The observation that people's predictions tend to be regressive compared to actual choices can thus be framed as indicating that people predict a more muted form of the fourfold pattern than actually prevails.
In addition to demonstrating that predicted preferences are regressive relative to actual preferences, we argue that two psychological concepts, the notion of risk-as-feelings (Loewenstein et al. 2001 ) and of an empathy gap (Loewenstein 1996) , help explain why predictions are systematically inaccurate in this way.
According to the notion of risk-as-feelings, people (1) often experience emotional reactions to risk and uncertainty and, critically, (2) make choices that are in part driven by these emotional reactions (Damasio 1994; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Mellers 2000; Mellers et al. 1999; Peters and Slovic 2000; Sinaceur et al. 2005; Slovic et al. 2002a, b; Slovic 1987; Windschitl and Wells 1998; Windschitl and Young 2001; Zeelenberg et al. 2000) . For instance, an individual may be "thrilled" by the possibility of winning a lottery and may therefore purchase a lottery ticket. Or, an individual may experience "fear," "stress," and "anxiety" when thinking about the possibility of an earthquake and may thus purchase earthquake insurance for their home. As these examples indicate, both positive and negative emotional reactions are commonly experienced in response to risk, with positive emotions presumably engendering risk seeking and negative emotions presumably engendering risk aversion.
If emotional reactions in part drive choices, then predicting the choices of others requires empathizing with their emotional reactions and with the extent to which their emotional reactions influence their choices. All else equal, accurate appraisals of others' emotional reactions should engender accurate predictions of their choices, and inaccurate appraisals should engender inaccurate predictions.
Unfortunately, the notion of an empathy gap suggests that people often hold somewhat inaccurate appraisals of others' affective experience and do not appreciate the extent to which affective experience influences others' choices (Loewenstein 1996 , Van Boven et al. 2000 . In particular, it appears that people generally believe (a) that others have more muted emotional reactions than they actually do, and (b) that the influence of emotional reactions on other's choices is less powerful that it actually is (these statements are roughly akin to, and are fashioned after, Loewenstein's Propositions 7.v and 7.vi; see also Van Boven and Loewenstein 2003) . For instance, consider someone who is thrilled at the possibility of winning a lottery and thus purchases lottery tickets. He or she (a) may not grasp the extent to which others are similarly thrilled, or (b) may not grasp that others indeed purchase lottery tickets because of such feelings. Consider someone who is made fearful, stressed, or anxious by the prospect of an earthquake and therefore buys earthquake insurance for their home. He or she may not realize (a) the extent to which others have similarly powerful affective reactions, or (b) that others similarly purchase insurance because of such affective reactions.
If positive emotional reactions yield risk seeking and negative emotional reactions yield risk aversion, but people believe that others show more muted emotional reactions than they actually do or are relatively uninfluenced by their feelings, then it follows that people will predict that others show relatively muted patterns of risk seeking and risk aversion. That is, people will predict that others show a dampened form of the fourfold pattern of risk seeking and risk aversion uncovered by Tversky and Kahneman (1986) . In this way, the notions of risk-as-feelings and an empathy gap jointly imply that predictions of others' risky preferences will be regressive compared to others' actual risky preferences.
In an insightful and influential paper, Hsee and Weber (1997) were perhaps the first to carefully examine predictions of others' risky choices. The analysis we have presented, implicating the notions of risk-as-feelings and an empathy gap, is largely based on their theoretical approach. Nevertheless, if one is not careful, one may wrongly conclude that our two research efforts suggest very different interpretations. We find that people's predictions of others' risky preferences are inappropriately regressive, whereas Hsee and Weber summarize their results as indicating that people's predictions of others' preference are not risk averse enough. Put differently, we argue for a statistical interaction, with predictions being either not risk averse enough or not risk seeking enough (depending on which of these two patterns actually prevails), but the data uncovered by Hsee and Weber appear to reveal only a main effect, with predictions simply being not risk averse enough.
In reality, our results and the results of Hsee and Weber are most likely complementary components of a single whole. It turns out that for all of the prospects they studied, Hsee and Weber report that their experimental participants' actual choices were risk averse (and participants' predictions of others' choices were less risk averse). Thus, because they did not examine prospects for which they reported observing riskseeking choices, Hsee and Weber may not have had the opportunity to observe the interaction we find. By expanding our scope to examine prospects eliciting risk seeking as well as risk aversion, we are able to observe the full interaction and to suggest that predictions are not insufficiently risk averse but are rather inappropriately regressive.
The finding that predictions are regressive or show a muted fourfold pattern relative to choices builds on recent work concerning affective influences on risk by Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) . These authors observed that prospects offering consequences associated with less pronounced affective reactions (e.g., a $100 voucher applicable toward phone bill expenses) yielded dampened versions of the fourfold pattern compared to prospects offering consequences associated with more pronounced affective reactions (e.g., a $100 voucher applicable toward expenses at a fancy French restaurant).
Rottenstreich and Hsee explain their results by appealing to the notion of risk-as-feelings in much the same way that we have. They argue that if positive emotional reactions yield risk seeking and negative emotional reactions yield risk aversion, but "affectpoor" consequences elicit less pronounced emotional reactions than "affect-rich" consequences, then affectpoor consequences should show relatively dampened versions of the fourfold pattern. Our work rests on essentially the same chain of logic. At the link in the chain where Rottenstreich and Hsee differentiate between affect-rich and affect-poor consequences, we differentiate between people's own emotional reactions (which are experienced as relatively more pronounced or as having a relatively more heavy influence on choices) and their perceptions of others' emotional reactions (which are perceived as relatively less pronounced or as having a relatively less heavy influence on choices). Thus, our work can be seen as an extension of Rottenstreich and Hsee's analysis to an interpersonal setting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present a total of four experiments. Experiment 1A establishes the finding of regressive misprediction in the domain of gains, and Experiment 1B extends this basic finding to the domain of losses. Experiments 2 and 3 provide further evidence of regressive misprediction and test our risk-as-feelings and empathy-based analysis. Consistent with this analysis, Experiment 2 indicates that explicitly instructing participants to consider their own emotional reactions is an effective debiasing technique: such instructions reduce the magnitude of mispredictions. Experiment 2 also establishes a boundary condition for the phenomenon of regressive prediction: we find that participants predicting the choices of a close friend, with whom they can presumably empathize relatively well, are not regressive. Experiment 3 shows that participants self-reporting high levels of empathy tend to make less regressive and thus more accurate predictions of others' choices. We conclude by discussing connections between our work and wellknown research on perceived consensus. We also speculate on some ways in which asking people to make predictions can debias these people's own choices.
Experiment 1A: Gains
Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2 share a common approach. From the same population, we draw two groups of participants: a choice group and a prediction group. Participants in the choice group make decisions for themselves. Participants in the prediction group predict the choices that a randomly chosen individual from the relevant population would be most likely to make. As a result, there is a clear standard for assessing the accuracy or inaccuracy of predictions: ideally, the mean prediction would be equal to the mean choice. We begin by applying this approach to prospects providing a potential outcome that is a gain over the current status quo.
Method
Participants were 165 University of Chicago MBA students. The study followed a 2 probability (small versus large) × 2 task (choice versus prediction) between-subjects design.
All participants were asked to consider a hypothetical marketing promotion that offered some chance at a cash prize of $4,000. In the small probability condition, participants were told that the chance of winning the prize was 1 in 1,000; in the large probability condition, participants were told that the chance of winning the prize was 99 in 100. Note that the probabilities in question are not complements.
In the choice conditions, participants indicated an amount of cash such that they would be indifferent between receiving that cash amount for sure and having the specified probability of winning the $4,000 cash prize. In the prediction conditions, participants indicated the cash amount they believed a randomly selected University of Chicago MBA would choose.
On the basis of Tversky and Kahneman's (1986) demonstrations of the fourfold pattern, we expected pervasive risk seeking for the small probability prospect. That is, we expected that responses selected by choosers would be greater than this prospect's actuarial value, which is $4. Choosers considering the small probability of 0.001 must, metaphorically, "jump" up from $0 (the cash amount that a zero probability of winning the prize is worth) to some larger cash amount. According to the notion of riskas-feelings, the magnitude of choosers' jumps will in part reflect the intensity of their affective reactions (with greater "excitement," "hope," or similar positive emotions about potentially winning the prize engendering greater jumps). However, according to the notion of an empathy gap, predictors will not appreciate the full intensity and impact of choosers' affective reactions. Thus, predicted cash amounts should be lower than chosen cash amounts, thereby evincing too little risk seeking.
Also, on the basis of Tversky and Kahneman's demonstrations of the fourfold pattern, we expected pervasive risk aversion for the large probability prospect. That is, we expected that responses selected by choosers would be lower than this prospect's actuarial value, which is $3,960. Choosers considering the large probability of 0.99 must, metaphorically, "drop" down from $4,000 (the cash amount that a sure chance of winning the prize is worth) to some smaller cash amount. According to the notion of risk-as-feelings, the magnitude of choosers' drops will in part reflect the intensity of their affective reactions (with greater "stress," "fear," "anxiety," or similar apprehension about potentially missing out on the prize engendering greater drops). However, according to the notion of an empathy gap, predictors will not appreciate the full intensity and impact of choosers' affective reactions. Thus, predicted cash amounts should be greater than chosen cash amounts, thereby evincing too little risk aversion. In sum, for both probability levels we expected predictions to be regressive with respect to choices.
Note that our analysis suggests that positive emotions are salient as someone considers a small probability gain, whereas negative emotions are salient as someone considers a large probability gain. To illustrate the intuition behind this suggestion, consider an individual applying for a lucrative, prestigious job promotion, and suppose that this individual believes that he or she is highly likely to be promoted. Despite the large probability of a gain, the individual may worry and stress about being turned down. The process may be an emotionally aversive experience for him or her. Yet, the same person may derive pleasure from holding a lottery ticket offering only a small probability of a lucrative payoff. Although the individual would not trade his or her promotion prospects for the lottery ticket, the emotional experience of "playing out" the promotion prospect may be negative, whereas the emotional experience of "playing out" the lottery may be positive (the possibility of different emotions being salient at different probabilities was perhaps first raised by Tversky and Fox 1995) .
A full investigation of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but we speculate that the psychology of reference points is of relevance here. Given a small probability, the salient reference point may be the status quo; compared to the status quo the possibility of a gain stirs positive emotions. On the other hand, given a large probability, the salient reference point may be the potential gain itself; the possibility of an unrealized gain may thus stir negative emotions.
Results and Discussion
The results, summarized in Table 1 , reveal that predictions were indeed excessively regressive, in the sense that they were closer to risk neutral than the choices were. Given a small probability of winning the $4,000, chosen cash amounts were significantly greater than predictions (medians of $10 and $5, p < 0 05 by the Mann-Whitney test). That is, at small probability, choices were risk seeking but predictions were less so. In contrast, given a large probability of winning the $4,000, chosen cash amounts were significantly lower than predictions (medians of $3,250 and $3,900, p < 0 05). That is, at large probability, choices were risk averse but predictions were less so. Furthermore, analysis of variance on Wilcoxon scores 1 revealed a significant probability by task interaction (F 1 164 = 5 20, p < 0 05).
The data from this and all of our subsequent studies follow somewhat skewed distributions. We have therefore elected to report nonparametric tests of statistical significance. However, we display both means and median in the accompanying tables, and for all of our studies, mean data yield exactly the same qualitative pattern as median data. Indeed, as a rule, mean Notes. Participants either chose the cash amount that they found just as attractive as the specified probability of winning $4,000 or predicted the choice of a random other.
data show substantially more extreme regressive misprediction than median data. We wish to emphasize that under most formulations the present results cannot be explained solely by the premise that predictors misestimate how attractive choosers find the $4,000. To see why, note that in prospect theory and related models, the utility of a prospect offering a single nonzero outcome x with probability p can be represented as w p v x . Here, v is a value function indexing the attractiveness of potential outcomes, w is a weighting function that quantifies the impact of probabilities, and the product of these two functions establishes the overall utility of a prospect. Let v c denote the actual value function for choices and v p denote the value function predictors believe choosers have. If predictors overestimated choosers' valuations of the $4,000, that is v p > v c , we would observe that predicted cash amounts were greater than chosen cash amounts-at both probability levels. On the other hand, if predictors underestimate choosers' valuations of the $4,000, that is v p < v c , we would observe that predicted cash amounts were lower than chosen cash amounts-at both probability levels. Because v does not vary with probabilities, mispredictions of the attractiveness of the $4,000 prize cannot by themselves explain a probability by task interaction by which predictions are lower than choices at small probability but greater than choices at large probability.
The finding of regressive predictions thus necessarily implicates a difference between how choosers react to probabilities and risk and how predictors anticipate that choosers will react to probabilities and risk. Let w c and w p quantify the impact of probabilities on choices and predictions, respectively. Our data can be accommodated by three possible patterns. First, regressive predictions would arise whenever w p is less than w c at small probabilities but greater than w c at large probabilities. Second, if, v p > v c , then regressive predictions might also arise if w p is very far below w c at small probabilities but only a little below w c at large probabilities. Third, if v p < v c , then regressive predictions might arise if w p is very far above w c at large probabilities but only a little above w c at small probabilities. No matter what the exact pattern, the critical aspect is an interaction by which the difference between w p and w c varies with probability (see Brandstatter et al. 2002 , Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001 , and Wu 1999 for detailed analyses of affective influences on weighting functions).
2
The results of Experiment 1A, which concern prospects involving a potential gain, reveal inaccurate, regressive predictions. We have proposed that the notions of risk-as-feelings and an empathy gap partially account for these results. If that is the case, we should also observe regressive mispredictions for prospects involving potential losses relative to the status quo. We turn to this possibility in Experiment 1B.
Experiment 1B: Losses
Method Participants were 62 University of Chicago MBA students enrolled in a negotiations course. The study followed essentially the same methodology as Experiment 1A. We again used a 2 probability (small versus large) × 2 task (choice versus prediction) betweensubjects design.
All participants were asked to imagine that as a consequence of an insurance lawsuit they faced some chance of losing $4,000. In the small probability condition, participants were told that the chance of losing the money was 1 in 1,000; in the large probability condition, participants were told that the chance of losing the money was 99 in 100. In the choice conditions, participants indicated an amount of cash such that they would be indifferent between paying that cash amount for sure and having the specified probability of losing $4,000. In the prediction conditions, participants indicated the cash amount they believed a randomly selected University of Chicago MBA would choose.
On the basis of Tversky and Kahneman's (1986) demonstrations of the fourfold pattern, we expected pervasive risk aversion for the small probability prospect and pervasive risk seeking for the large probability loss. As before, we expected predictions to be inappropriately regressive, showing both less risk aversion than risk-averse choices and less risk seeking than risk-seeking choices. 2 In this light, it is important to untangle a potential ambiguity involving the term "regressive misprediction" and graphs of the weighting functions w c and w p . For instance, suppose that w c p > w p p ≥ p for small p and w c p < w p p ≤ p for large p. Here, predictions are more regressive than choices, in the sense that the graph of w p is everywhere closer to the identity line representing risk neutrality than is the graph of w c . However, one could also say that w c is more regressive than w p , in the sense that the graph of w c is everywhere (weakly) closer to a value of 1/2 than is the graph of w p . We have defined regressive misprediction as the tendency to make predictions that are closer to risk neutrality than choices are. Thus, our use of the term "regressive" is meant to invoke a comparison with risk neutrality rather than any other standard of comparison. Notes. Participants either chose the cash amount that they found just as aversive as the specified probability of losing $4,000 or predicted the choice of a random other.
Results and Discussion
The results, summarized in Table 2 , reveal that predictions were indeed excessively regressive. Given a small probability of losing the $4,000, the absolute value of choices was significantly greater than that of predictions (medians of −5 versus −4, p < 0 05 by the Mann-Whitney test). That is, predictions were less risk averse than choices. In contrast, given a large probability of winning the $4,000, the absolute value of choices was significantly lower than that of predictions (medians of −$3 500 versus −$3 900, p < 0 05). That is, predictions were less risk seeking than choices. Analysis of variance on Wilcoxon scores again revealed a significant probability by task interaction (F 1 58 = 4 11, p < 0 05). One interesting observation from this experiment is that the median prediction under small probability was equal to the actuarial value of the prospect in question. Although we have stressed the importance of affective factors, we have not yet elaborated on what other factors may also influence risky choices and predictions. Two nonaffective factors seem especially important and may be connected to the use of actuarial value by some prediction participants.
First, in certain circumstances, choices and predictions can be made by appealing to what are perceived to be "socially sanctioned" or "normatively appropriate" rules or principles. The setting of Experiments 1A and 1B offers just such a rule-the calculation of actuarial value. Calculating actuarial value may not be appealing to many people in the population at large, but may be to participants in Experiments 1A and 1B who, to reiterate, are MBA students.
Second, predictions may be influenced by group stereotypes. For instance, Weber and Hsee (1998, 1999 ; see also Hsee and Weber 1999) report that both American and Chinese participants predict that Americans are more risk seeking than they actually are, and Siegrist et al. (2002) report that both men and women predict that men are more risk seeking than they actually are. Of course, there may sometimes be a connection between rules and stereotypes. Stereotypes of some groups (e.g., MBAs) may include the impression that their members tend to use certain rules (e.g., calculation of actuarial value).
In Experiment 1B, 10 of 17 participants in the small probability prediction condition settled on a cash amount equal to actuarial value, and 7 of 18 participants in the choice condition did so ( 2 = 1 39, ns). No other condition in any of the experiments we report showed such a pronounced tendency toward reliance on actuarial value. Nevertheless, collapsing across small and large probability reveals that predictions in Experiment 1B were significantly more likely to follow actuarial value than choices were. Overall, 15 of 30 participants in the two prediction conditions settled on a cash amount equal to actuarial value, but only 8 out of 32 participants in the two choice conditions did so ( 2 = 4 15, p < 0 05). This finding, although not too strong, can be seen as buttressing our analysis. In the setting of Experiment 1B, an empathy gap may manifest in two ways. Both choosers and predictors might base their responses largely on affective criteria, but predictors might not appreciate the intensity of choosers' affective reactions and thus make regressive predictions. Alternatively, choosers and predictors might base their responses on different criteria. Choosers might tend to weigh affective considerations relatively heavily when forming their preferences, but predictors might fail to anticipate this and instead predict that choices will neglect affect in favor of some nonaffective, calculative rule like actuarial value.
Recently, Weber et al. (2005;  see also Ames et al. 2004) suggested that there are three main methods people use for making decisions. In calculation-based decision making, the evaluation and combination of probability and outcome information guides preferences (as in expected utility or prospect theory). In recognition-based decision making, the decision maker identifies his or her current circumstance as conforming to some known rule, case, or role requirement that dictates a certain course of action. Finally, in affect-based decision making, the decision maker is guided by his or her immediate affective reactions to each available option. Notable similar analyses have been put forth in the managerial literature by March and Heath (1994) and Shapira (1997) . Related analyses have been pursued in the psychological literature by Goldstein and Weber (1995) , Klein et al. (1993 Klein et al. ( , 1995 , Gilboa and Schmeidler (1999) , Hastie (1988, 1993) , and Rettinger and Hastie (2001) . Our discussion of actuarial value and stereotypes may be reframed as suggesting that people often choose for themselves using affect-based methods but nevertheless predict others' choices using calculation-or recognition-based methods. This framing stresses that mispredictions do not arise because empathy gaps lead choosers and predictors to different assessments of the attractiveness of outcomes or to different weighting of the likelihood of each outcome (i.e., different calculations). Instead, mispredictions arise because choosers and predictors may simply differentially rely on affective versus nonaffective methods.
3 Experiments 1A and 1B established the finding of regressive mispredictions in the domain of gains and losses, respectively. In Experiment 2, we return to the domain of gains and study a population, college undergraduates, for whom actuarial value is unlikely to hold any special appeal. We also build on our earlier findings in two ways.
First, we expand our scope to include intermediate probabilities as well as small and large probabilities. The work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggests that we should expect risk-averse choices for the intermediate probability prospects we study, and thus we anticipate that predictions for such prospects will be risk averse, although not as risk averse as choices are.
Second, we introduce new experimental conditions meant to facilitate empathic considerations and thus reduce the magnitude of mispredictions. In one condition, we explore a potential debiasing technique. We briefly instruct participants who are about to make a prediction to "please think about what your reactions would be in this situation, that is, 'put yourself in the shoes' of" the person whose preferences you are predicting. Presumably, these instructions ensure that participants explicitly consider their own reactions, and moreover, suggest that those reactions may be diagnostic of others. Thus, these instructions may allow participants to partially bridge any potential empathy gap and make more accurate predictions. In another condition, we explore a boundary condition on regressive predictions. We ask participants to predict the choices of a close friend. Because participants can presumably empathize relatively well with a close friend, predictions of friends' choices should evince little regressiveness. 3 In a related vein, psychometric studies of risk perception typically indicate that experts' assessments of risky products and enterprises (e.g., nuclear power plants, general aviation, DNA technology, pharmaceuticals, etc.) are highly correlated with expected annual mortality, but that laypeople's risk assessments are not highly correlated with this factor. Rather than being guided by calculative considerations involving, for example, probabilities of an accident and predicted number of lives lost, laypeople's perceptions are highly correlated with two more affect-based considerations, dread (defined at the high end by perceived lack of control, catastrophic potential, and inequitable distribution of risks and benefits) and unknowability (defined at the high end by unobservability, lack of reliable information, and delay in manifestation of harm). For a thorough treatment of these topics, see Slovic (1987) .
Experiment 2: Facilitating Empathy
Method Participants were 287 University of Michigan undergraduates. The study followed a 3 probability (small versus intermediate versus large) × 4 task (choice versus standard prediction versus prediction with consideration of oneself versus prediction of a close friend) between-subjects design.
As before, the small probability we examined was 0.001 and the large probability was 0.99. The intermediate probability we examined was 0.50. Unlike our earlier studies, participants this time considered a specified probability of winning a $2,000 prize rather than a $4,000 prize.
We also departed from our earlier studies by using a different response mode for our dependent variable. Instead of writing in the cash amount that came to their minds, participants were presented with a list of cash amounts and for each amount indicated whether they preferred (or predicted that others would prefer) to receive that amount for sure or to retain the specified probability of winning $2,000. Thus, rather than "filling in the blank," participants in this study made a series of pairwise decisions (between a sure, riskless amount and the specified probability of winning $2,000). This response mode has had a long history in psychophysics, where it is often termed the "staircase method."
For the 1/1 000 chance of winning, the cash amounts included in the list of pairwise decisions were $1, $2, $5, $10, $15, $20, $30, $40, $50, $60, $70, $80, and $90. For the 50/100 chance of winning, the cash amounts included in the list of pairwise decisions were $400, $500, $600, $700, $800, $900, $1,000, $1,100, $1,200, $1,300, $1,400, $1,500, and $1,600. For the 99/100 chance of winning, the cash amounts included in the list of pairwise decisions were $1,100, $1,200, $1,300, $1,400, $1,500, $1,600, $1,700, $1,800, $1,850, $1,900, $1,950, $1,980, and $1,990. The largest sure amount opted for by a participant was coded as that participant's choice or prediction.
The choice and standard prediction conditions paralleled our earlier studies. In the "prediction with consideration of oneself" conditions, participants encountered the following brief set of instructions: "As you make your prediction, please think about what your reactions would be in this situation, that is, 'put yourself in the shoes' of the student."
Finally, in the "prediction of close friend" condition, participants were asked to consider a close friend of theirs, write down his or her initials as well as three adjectives that best described him or her, and to predict the choices that would be made by this friend.
To reiterate, we expected that explicit instructions to consider one's own reactions would reduce the Notes. Participants either chose a cash amount that they found just as attractive as the specified probability of winning $2,000, predicted the choice of a random other after being given instructions to consider their own self's emotional reactions, predicted the choice of a random other, or predicted the choice of a close friend. Letter superscripts summarize the Mann-Whitney tests. Within each row, different letters indicate a significant difference p < 0 05 .
magnitude of mispredictions and thus prove to be an effective debiasing technique. Additionally, we hypothesized that it should be relatively easy to appreciate the affective experience of a close personal friend, and that predictions of a close friend's choices would thus show little regressiveness. In sum, compared to choices, standard predictions should be regressive, but predictions made with consideration of oneself and predictions of close friends should be less regressive.
Results and Discussion
The results, detailed in Table 3 , corroborate our hypotheses. At all three probability levels, standard predictions were more regressive than all three other conditions. Assuming a null hypothesis that it is equally likely that predictions will be regressive or antiregressive compared to each of the other three conditions, and ignoring issues of independence, the binomial likelihood of predictions being more regressive than all three remaining conditions at all three probability levels is 1/2 9 = 0 002. Given a small probability of winning the $2,000, choices (median of $25) were significantly greater than standard predictions (median of $10, p < 0 05 by the Mann-Whitney test). That is, predictions were less risk seeking than choices. Predictions of a close friend were also greater than standard predictions (median of $30, p < 0 01). No other pair of conditions produced a statistically significant difference.
Given an intermediate probability, choices (median of $800) were significantly lower than standard predictions (median of $1,000, p < 0 05). That is, predictions were less risk averse than choices. No other pair of conditions produced a statistically significant difference.
Given a large probability, choices (median of $1,850) were significantly lower than standard predictions (median of $1,980, p = 0 02). That is, predictions were less risk averse than choices. Also significantly lower than standard predictions were both predictions made with a consideration of oneself (median of $1,825, p < 0 01) and predictions made for a close friend (median of $1,800, p < 0 05). No other pair of conditions produced a statistically significant difference.
An analysis of variance on Wilcoxon scores and restricted only to small and large probabilities and only to choices and standard predictions yielded a statistically significant interaction of small/large probability and task (F 1 109 = 7 52, p < 0 01). Such analyses comparing standard predictions and predictions made with a consideration of oneself (F 1 96 = 10 09, p < 0 01) and comparing standard predictions and predictions of a close friend (F 1 108 = 9 78, p < 0 01) also yielded highly significant interactions of small/large probability and task. No other pair of conditions yielded a statistically significant interaction of small/large probability and task.
These results build on our earlier studies by expanding our scope to include intermediate probabilities and by further corroborating our analysis invoking risk-as-feelings and empathy gaps. Based on this analysis, we identified a potential debiasing technique and an important boundary condition for regressive prediction. It appears that briefly instructing participants to consider their own reactions diminishes the tendency to regressive prediction, and that regressive prediction does not generalize from predictions of unknown others to predictions of close friends.
In Experiment 3, we examine an additional factor suggested by the notions of risk-as-feelings and of an empathy gap: the extent to which a key personality variable may moderate our results. In particular, we investigate the connections between regressive prediction and self-reported empathy. If empathic ability allows one to bridge potential empathy gaps, then those high in empathic ability should tend to form less regressive and thus more accurate predictions.
We also for the first time collect both choices and predictions from each participant. In doing so, we hope to observe that predictions are more regressive than choices within the data of individual participants. This observation would provide strong corroboration of the notion of regressive misprediction.
Experiment 3: Self-Reported Empathy and a Within-Subjects Test Method Participants were 80 University of Michigan undergraduates. The study followed a 2 probability (small versus large) × 2 task (choice versus prediction) design. Probability was a between-subjects factor; a given participant encountered either a small probability or a large probability but not both. Task was a within-subjects factor; each participant made both choices and predictions. The order of these tasks was counterbalanced.
Thus, each participant provided us with both a "first response" and a "second response." For approximately half of the participants, the first response was a prediction and the second response was a choice. For the remaining participants, this assignment was reversed. Note, then, that a between-subjects comparison of first-response choices with first-response predictions may serve as a replication of our earlier results.
Within the data of individual participants, predictions will be more regressive than choices, if in "adjusting" from their first response to form their second response, the typical participant followed an approach that implicitly "acknowledges" a default tendency toward regressive misprediction. That is, if the typical participant deliberately settled on a choice that was less regressive than his or her prediction or on a prediction that was more regressive than his or her choice. However, it is well known that numerical estimates are typically anchored to previously made numerical estimates. Thus, even conditional on observing predictions that are more regressive than choices within the data of individual participants, we should expect that a between-subjects comparison of second responses would yield a smaller divergence between choices and predictions than would a between-subjects comparison of first responses.
As before, the small probability we examined was 0.001 and the large probability was 0.99. As in Experiment 2, participants considered a specified probability of winning a $2,000 prize. We also employed the dependent variable of Experiment 2-pairwise decisions between a sure, riskless amount and the specified probability of winning $2,000-in the current study. The sure, riskless amounts used were the same as in Experiment 2.
Finally, after providing their choices and predictions, participants completed the well-known empathic concern scale developed by Davis (1983) . This scale consists of seven items designed to tap a person's ability or tendency to empathize with others. To illustrate, two of the items included on the scale are the statements "I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person" and "Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems."
Participants rated themselves on each item using a five-point response measure anchored on the terms "does not describe me well" and "describes me very well." We then constructed a self-reported "empathy index" for each predictor by summing across the scores for items tapping empathic abilities (such as the first statement above) and the reversed scores for items tapping nonempathic attributes (such as the second statement). Thus, the empathy index could range from 5 =7 * 1 to 35 =7 * 5 , with higher scores corresponding to greater self-reported empathy. The mean score on this scale was 25.6, the median was 26, the standard deviation was 4.43, and Cronbach's across the seven items was 0.73.
We begin with a between-subjects comparison of first responses. As expected, these data replicate our earlier results. Given a small probability of winning the $2,000, chosen cash amounts were significantly greater than predictions (medians of $30 versus $20, p < 0 05 by the Mann-Whitney test). In contrast, given a large probability of winning the $2,000, chosen cash amounts were significantly lower than predictions (medians of $1,800 versus $1,900, p < 0 05). Furthermore, analysis of variance on Wilcoxon scores again revealed a significant probability by task interaction (F 1 58 = 4 16, p < 0 05).
Also, as expected, a between-subjects comparison of second responses reveals little if any evidence of regressive prediction. Second-response choices and predictions were virtually identical given both small probability (medians of $25 versus $30) and large probability (medians of $1,900 versus $1,850).
More importantly, examining the data of each participant revealed that only 18 of 80 participants made a prediction equal to their own choices (4 of these 18 settled on actuarial value for both responses), and that of the remaining participants, 38 made a prediction that was more regressive than their choice, whereas only 24 made a prediction that was less regressive than their choice (p < 0 05 by the binomial test). Evidently, in "adjusting" from their first response to form their second response, the typical participant followed an approach that implicitly "acknowledges" the notion of regressive misprediction. The typical participant deliberately settled on a choice that was less regressive than his or her prediction or on a prediction that was more regressive than his or her choice.
We formed an additional within-subjects test by constructing a new variable, called "reaction to uncertainty" (RU) , that collapses across responses given under both task orders and both probability levels. For the small probability condition (i.e., a probability of 0.001), RU is simply equal to the response indicated by participants. For the large probability conditions (where the probability is 0.99, which is 0.01 less than 1.00), RU is calculated according to the following formula: RU = $2 000 minus participant's response) divided by 10. The variable RU combines responses reflecting "jumps up from $0" and responses reflecting "drops down from $2,000," by ignoring the directional difference between them and bringing both onto the same order of magnitude.
The larger is RU, the more risk seeking is a response provided at small probability and the more risk averse is a response provided at large probability. Thus, the hypothesis of regressive misprediction implies that choice RU will be greater than prediction RU. Consistent with the hypothesis of regressive misprediction, examining the difference between each participants' choice RU and his or her prediction RU revealed that this difference was significantly positive (median of 5, p = 0 01, by the Mann-Whitney test).
Finally, we investigated the role of self-reported empathy by examining the correlation between this measure and both choice RU and prediction RU. The correlation between self-reported empathy and choice RU was quite meager r = 0 02 , revealing that a greater self-reported ability to appreciate the emotional reactions of others bore no relationship to one's own choices. Nevertheless, the correlation between self-reported empathy and prediction RU was substantially positive r = 0 24, p < 0 05 .
A coarser analysis that divided participants using a median split of self-reported empathy also suggested that prediction RU but not choice RU varied with self-reported empathy. Prediction RU differed significantly between those below and above the median of self-reported empathy (means of 18 and 27, t = 1 95, p = 0 05; medians of 10 and 20, p < 0 01 by the Mann-Whitney test), showing larger values and thus indicating less regressive predictions for those above the median. Choice RU did not differ significantly between those below and above the median of selfreported empathy (means of 29 and 32, t = 0 47, ns; medians of 20 on both measures).
Consistent with our analysis tapping risk-as-feelings and an empathy gap, it appears that the greater one's self-reported ability to appreciate others' emotional reactions, the less regressive and thus the more accurate were one's predictions of others' risky preferences. Indeed, the relationship between self-reported empathy and prediction RU held even after controlling for choice RU. A linear regression with prediction RU as the dependent variable and both choice RU and self-reported empathy as independent variables produced the following relationship: prediction RU = −17 6 + 0 43 choice RU + 1 06 self-reported empathy and showed a statistically significant effect of each dependent variable (for choice RU, t = 6 35, p < 0 001; for self-reported empathy, t = 2 53, p < 0 01; R 2 = 0 38).
General Discussion
In four studies, involving both gains and losses, we consistently observed that people failed to accurately predict the risky choices of people that were not highly familiar to them. Predictions were systematically regressive relative to actual choices. Moreover, such regressive mispredictions appear to implicate the notions of risk-as-feelings and of an empathy gap. Although people commonly experience hope, fear, excitement, anxiety, and other emotions when confronting risk and make choices that in part reflect these emotions, they may fail to appreciate the extent to which others also experience and make risky choices on the basis of such emotions. Building on our analysis of regressive misprediction, we identified a potential debiasing technique, delineated an important boundary condition on regressive misprediction, and isolated the role of a key personality variable. Explicit instructions to consider one's own reactions (Experiment 2) dampen the regressiveness of predictions. Moreover, regressiveness does not generalize to predictions of the choices of a close friend (Experiment 2), with whom it is presumably easy to empathize. Finally, self-reported empathic ability moderates the magnitude of mispredictions (Experiment 3).
In terms of our introductory example involving pharmaceutical managers who are considering the potential development of a new allergy drug, our results suggest that these managers will overestimate consumers' willingness to try a new brand (if doing so is perceived, by the consumer, to offer an intermediate probability of an improvement over the consumer's current brand), underestimate rivals' willingness to attempt development of a next generation drug (if this is a prospect offering a small probability of a large profit), and underestimate employees' attraction to bonus-based compensation schemes (if bonuses are tied to a small probability of successful development of the drug). In all of these cases, the accuracy of managers' predictions should improve if prior to making predictions managers are asked consider what their own preferences would be in the relevant circumstances or to imagine what a close friend would decide in such circumstances.
Perceived Consensus, Perceived Difference, and Predictions At first blush, observations of systematic differences between people's own choices and their predictions of others' choices may seem to contradict the vast literature on perceived consensus. This research has shown that people in fact commonly assume, often to an unwarranted degree, that others think, want, and feel what they themselves think, want, and feel (Dawes 1989 , Chambers et al. 2003 , Epley et al. 2004 , Hoch 1987 , Kruger and Burrus 2004 , Krueger and Clement 1994 , Marks and Miller 1987 , Ross et al. 1977 , Van Boven et al. 2000 .
In fact, however, it is certainly logically possible for both (some) perceived consensus and (some) perceived difference to coexist. Indeed, we suggest that there may be a simple relationship between perceptions of consensus and perceptions of difference, and that understanding this relationship may help diagnose exactly what kinds of mispredictions are likely to arise in a given situation (cf. Ames 2004) .
Borrowing ideas put forth in an important paper by Loewenstein (1996) , we suggest that in forming predictions people may tend to believe that the type of emotional states they hold are also held by others (this statement positing perceived consensus is akin to Loewenstein's Proposition 7.iv), yet underestimate the intensity or impact of emotional states held by others (this statement positing perceived difference is akin to Loewenstein's Propositions 7.v and 7.vi) .
In this framework, mispredictions can arise in two distinct ways. First, people may correctly anticipate the types of emotions others will experience (accurate perceptions of consensus), but incorrectly surmise that others will experience only dampened degrees of these emotions (inaccurate perceptions of difference). Exactly this sort of misunderstanding appears to underlie the prediction errors we have found. Indeed, recall that the results of Experiment 3 reveal both a high degree of correlation between participants' choices and their predictions of others' choices (i.e., perceived consensus) and systematic prediction inaccuracies (i.e., perceived difference).
Second, people may incorrectly surmise that the type of emotions they experience will also be experienced by others (inaccurate perceptions of consensus). Exactly this sort of misunderstanding appears to underlie a recent finding reported by Van Boven et al. (2000) . We investigated predictions concerning one key aspect of prospect theory, the fourfold pattern of risk preferences. Van Boven et al. investigated predictions concerning another key aspect of prospect theory, loss aversion. In particular, these authors examined people's perceptions of the endowment effect, the tendency, driven by loss aversion, to value an object more highly after one owns it. They observed that both owners and nonowners overestimated the similarity between their own valuation of a good and the valuation of people in the other role. Interestingly, these cross-person empathy gaps were reflected in within-person empathy gaps: people tended to mispredict what their own valuation would be if they were placed in the other role. Evidently, nonowners could not empathize with owners' emotional attachment to goods they owned, and owners could not empathize with nonowners' lack of attachment (cf. Loewenstein and Adler 1995, Carmon and Ariely 2000) .
The framework just outlined distinguishes between the type and intensity of emotional reactions. It suggests that people frequently perceive consensus with regard to what types of emotions they and others hold but perceive differences with regard to the intensity with which they and others hold these emotions. We wish to emphasize that this framework provides a guide for understanding agreement or disagreement between choices and predictions only when one or both are driven by affective considerations. When neither choices nor predictions are based entirely or even primarily on emotional considerations, there may be numerous ways by which the two agree or disagree. For instance, in a given situation, choosers may tend to follow one relevant rule while predictors (mistakenly) follow another.
Note also that mispredictions and misunderstandings of risk preferences can arise whenever predictors and choosers hold different likelihood judgments but predictors do not realize this to be the case. For instance, Wu et al. (2003) report that employees are typically more pessimistic and managers more optimistic in judging work projects' likelihood of success. However, because managers are not aware of this difference in likelihood judgment, they frequently conclude that employees who are reluctant to pursue potential projects are unduly risk averse.
Can Predicting Others' Preferences Debias One's Own Choices?
We have repeatedly discussed the possibility of debiasing predictions. Interestingly, one might also flip perspectives to discuss the possibility of debiasing choices. It is often argued that risk-neutral choices are (in many managerial and other circumstances) normatively advisable, in the sense that choices reflecting substantial risk aversion or risk seeking are unlikely to maximize payoffs over the long run or over an entire portfolio of decisions. Put in our terms, these arguments hold that predicted preferences are more normative than actual choices, exactly because they are more regressive than actual choices.
Given that predictions might be more "coolheaded" and less emotional than choices, it is perhaps unsurprising that they are also more normative. However, if predicted preferences are relatively more normative preferences, then one might ask whether it is possible to debias choices by making them more like predictions. A potentially affirmative answer may be suggested by our within-subjects data from Experiment 3. There, choices made after predictions were "anchored" to these predictions. These "secondresponse" choices were somewhat more regressive, and thus somewhat more normative, than "firstresponse" choices, which had been made without prior predictions (median first-response choices were $30 and $1,800, whereas median second-response choices were $25 and $1,900, although these differences were not statistically significant). Presumably, a stronger anchoring manipulation than the very weak one we used could have transformed second-response choices even more, making them very similar to firstresponse predictions.
Thus, just as assessing one's own choices prior to making predictions of others' choices may improve the quality of predictions, making predictions prior to making one's own choices may improve the quality of one's choices. A great deal of research has stressed the practical import of simple procedures that help people improve their choices by alleviating the tendency to certain systematic biases (e.g., Arkes 1991 , Bleichrodt et al. 2001 , Fischhoff 1982 , Hershey and Baron 1987 , Larrick 2004 , Mussweiler et al. 2000 , Payne et al. 1999 , Weber 1994 . Our work suggests one such simple procedure: when choosing for yourself, start by making predictions of what others would do.
